Burge on Mental Causation by Marko Delić
561
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XIX, No. 57, 2019
Burge on Mental Causation
MARKO DELIĆ
University of Split, Split, Croatia
The article discusses Tyler Burge’s views concerning the debate about 
the causal effi cacy of mental properties, as found in his article “Mind-
Body Causation and Explanatory Practice.” Burge argues that a proper 
understanding of kind-individuation and causal explanation in science 
gives strong prima facie reasons for believing that mental and physi-
cal properties are not mutually exclusive. He does so by analysing the 
strength of two metaphysical theses which standardly underlie the de-
bate—token physicalism and the “Completeness of physics.” I present 
his analysis and argue that without an account of mental causation, 
his analysis does not support the conclusion that mental and physical 
properties are not mutually exclusive. Also, I question the methodologi-
cal adequacy of Burge’s analysis for scientifi c practice. 
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1. Introduction
For several decades now philosophers of mind have been struggling 
with the question of whether, and how could mental states (and events), 
in virtue of their mental properties (such as their intentional or phe-
nomenal properties) exert any causal infl uence on the world. The worry 
that they do not exert any such infl uence is suggested by two indepen-
dently plausible metaphysical theses. First of these, the “Completeness 
of physics” (CP) states that all physical effects are fully determined by 
law by a purely physical prior history (Papineau 2000: 179). Accord-
ing to the second thesis, the “Irreducibility of the Mental” (IM) mental 
properties are not reducible to physical properties (Putnam, Fodor). 
Now, if every physical event (a certain behaviour) is completely deter-
mined by prior physical events (states of the body or the central ner-
vous system), and the mental properties (a certain intentional content) 
of those events cannot be reduced to their physical properties, it seems 
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that mental properties are excluded from being a possible cause of that 
piece of behaviour.1
The problem has come to be known as the “Exclusion Problem” (EP), 
most famously associated with the work of Jaegwon Kim. EP presents 
itself as a problem for the “non-reductivist” types of physicalism. While 
discussing the causal effi cacy of the mental, Tyler Burge develops his 
views by analysing the so-called “Token-Identity Physicalism” (TIP). 
Being a non-reductivist position, TIP can generate the EP. In his ar-
ticle “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice” Burge views the 
“Mental Causation Debate”2 (MCD) as a result of metaphysical theses 
which, contrary to the conviction of many contemporary philosophers, 
do not possess a justifi ed theoretical motivation in the actual sciences 
of cognition. He proposes shifting MCD from the terrain of metaphysics 
to the terrain of actual cognitive sciences, whose practice Burge consid-
ers to be the main umpire in MCD. Burge’s strategy is twofold. First, 
Burge tries to undermine TIP on standard externalist intuitions, thus 
discouraging the motivation for the identifi cation of mental and physi-
cal events. Second, he tries to bring the notion of causal powers closer 
to the epistemic endeavours of actual scientifi c practice and argue that 
the indispensability of mental vocabulary in psychological explana-
tion warrants our belief in the effi cacy of mental properties and makes 
MCD redundant.
The fi rst section of the paper will present the EP, and TIP as un-
derstood by Burge. The second section will consider Burge’s attempts 
to undermine the theoretical motivation of TIP. The third section will 
be concerned with Burge’s understanding of causal powers and the 
strength of CP as a premise in EP. Finally, the last section will try to 
show that, contra Burge, the metaphysical debate about the causal ef-
fi cacy of the mental (MCD) has real motivation in the actual practice of 
cognitive sciences. Also, I will argue that Burge’s understanding of the 
“autonomous coexistence” of psychological and neuroscientifi c explana-
tion cannot be defended without an account of mental causation and 
giving an adequate account of mental causation forces Burge back into 
the very thing he aims to undermine—the MCD.
1 The present article is based on a talk given at the annual conference of the 
Society for the Advancement of Philosophy “New topics in Philosophy” (Zagreb, 2018). 
Also, I would like to thank Dunja Jutronić, Dario Škarica and Ljudevit Hanžek for 
commentary and support in writing this article.
2 The phrase Mental Causation Debate (from now on MCD) is due to Tim Crane 
(Crane 1995). I will use it to refer to the general debate concerning the causal effi cacy 
of the mental.
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2. The exclusion problem
Token identity physicalism advocates a weaker type of identity be-
tween the mental and the physical. It can be described as consisting of 
the next two theses:3
1) For every mental event x there exists a physical event y such 
that x=y 
2) Mental properties M of x cannot be reduced to physical proper-
ties P of y (IM)
The fi rst theses makes TIP a physicalist position by giving ontological 
priority to the physical (Crane 2003) while the second thesis makes 
TIP a non-reductive version of physicalism. The second thesis (IM) is 
suggested by independently plausible theses such as the multiple real-
ization thesis (Putnam 1967; Fodor 1974) according to which a single 
mental type can be realized by different physical types; or the explana-
tory gap which exists between fi rst-person phenomenal descriptions 
and physical descriptions of those experiences (Nagel 1974; Levine 
1983). One way for the exclusion problem to arise is to adopt a view 
of causation which treats events as being causally effi cacious not in 
virtue of them simply being events but in virtue of the properties these 
events possess (Crane 2003).4 Then, if the physical properties of a cer-
tain event, a piece of behaviour for example, are caused exclusively by 
the physical properties of prior events, as CP suggests, it follows that 
the mental properties of those prior events are excluded from being 
possible causes of that piece of behaviour.5
Burge’s way of handling EP is to undermine the metaphysical basis 
which generates it, thus discouraging MCD. This is expressed in the 
motto at the beginning of his paper:
Materialist metaphysics has been given more weight than it deserves. Re-
fl ection on explanatory practice has been given too little. (Burge 2007: 344) 
3. Undermining token-identity physicalism
Burge’s fi rst step is to show that the motivation for identifi cation of 
mental and physical events is not justifi ed. For Burge, that amounts 
to showing that the respective sciences, psychology as the study of the 
mental and neuroscience as the study of the nervous system, individu-
ate their kinds in an essentially different way. While neuroscience in-
3 Only fi rst of these is necessary for token physicalism. In conjunction with the 
second it becomes a non-reductive version of physicalism.
4 This is also how Burge sets the exclusion problem in one version (Burge 2006: 
346).
5 Burge notices that this way of understanding CP leaves open the possibility that, 
although mental properties cannot be the causes of physical properties, they could 
nevertheless cause other mental properties. However, this would, as he immediately 
notices, severely limit the causal effi cacy of the mental. After all, mental properties 
are invoked to explain behaviour.
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dividuates kinds narrowly, only with respect to the intrinsic, bodily 
properties, psychological kinds are individuated with reference to their 
intentional content, which is relational, that is, environmentally de-
pendent. This view is supported by well-known externalist thought ex-
periments. Here, I will use Burge’s “aluminium-twalum” example. We 
imagine a person A whose environment contains the metal aluminium. 
When A interacts or thinks about aluminium his thoughts are about 
the aluminium present in his environment. Now, imagine a person B 
who is physically identical to person B, only whose environment con-
tains a different metal, twalum. Twalum is (phenomenologically and 
practically) indistinguishable (to both A and B) from aluminium, yet it 
is a metal of a different chemical kind. What seems to follow is that the 
respective contents of A’s and B’s mental states is different. While A’s 
thoughts are about aluminium, B’s thoughts are about twalum, despite 
the physical states of A and B being identical (Burge 2007: 316–317).
What is suggested by the thought experiment is that a certain phys-
ical event-token, which is a plausible candidate for the identifi cation 
with a mental event-token, can have different intentional contents on 
different instantiations. This, according to Burge, is enough to show 
that mental events cannot be identical to physical events (Burge 2007: 
350–351).
Since externalism per se is not the topic of this article, we will not 
concern ourselves with the objections raised against it here. However, 
in his paper, Burge discusses an objection made to his argument by 
Donald Davidson. Since Burge’s reply reveals his understanding of 
kind-individuation, it will be illuminating to present it here.
Davidson argues that broad identifi cation of kinds doesn’t refute 
token-identity. He gives the example of a sunburn. While sunburns are 
individuated environmentally (with reference to an ultraviolet radiat-
ing object, most commonly the Sun), it is still plausible to identify every 
token of a sunburn with a certain physiologically specifi ed state of the 
skin. Burge agrees with Davidson but rejects his analogy of sunburns 
and mental events on epistemic grounds. The difference is, Burge ar-
gues, that sunburns can be identifi ed in purely physiological terms, 
without any reference to a potential environmental cause, while men-
tal kinds do not admit such identifi cations. This in turn, is grounded in 
the fact that physiological descriptions of sunburns provide systematic 
and explanatory ways of individuating sunburns, while descriptions of 
brain states upon which mental kinds (plausibly) depend do not (Burge 
2007: 352–353).
The system of intentional content attribution is the fundamental means of 
identifying intentional mental states and events in psychological explana-
tion and in our self-attributions. In fact, we have no other systematic way of 
identifying such states and events. (Burge 2007: 354)
Physiological properties, unlike intentional properties, do not allow 
for a systematic and explanatory way of individuating mental kinds. 
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Therefore, Burge believes it to be theoretically unmotivating to insist 
on TIP.
4. Questioning the role of CP
Similar considerations underlie Burge’s analysis of the role CP has in 
EP. In section 1, CP was presented in terms of event properties. The 
physical properties of a certain event are completely determined (or 
have their probabilities completely determined) by the physical proper-
ties of prior events. This is the same as saying that an event can cause 
physical effects only in virtue of its physical properties. To see how 
Burge understands CP and its strength as a premise in EP, we need 
to explain how Burge understands causation. Burge believes the best 
way to understand causation is to see how causal explanation works 
in actual science. He discusses the notion of causal powers. For Burge, 
the causal powers of an event are determined by the properties which 
are relevant in describing the patterns of causation in which the kind 
of that event enters into. Since these patterns are different, depending 
on the explanatory aims of specifi c sciences, the properties relevant for 
describing them will differ too (Burge 2007: 346–347).
Applying the analysis to our present subject, CP amounts to claim-
ing that the patterns of causation identifi ed in physical explanation 
need to invoke only (and exclusively) physical properties of a certain 
event. If, however, the patterns of causation are different, as they are 
in psychology, the restriction that only physical properties are relevant 
in determining the causal powers of an event becomes unwarranted, 
since the properties (and thus the causal powers of the event) needed 
to explain these patterns, change. The only way to insist on such a 
restriction would be to show that mentalistic (psychological) discourse, 
that is, the patterns of causation psychology describes, is either non-
descriptive or non-causal, which is, as Burge points out, far from be-
ing the case (Burge 2007: 347). If the battle is fought on the grounds 
of actual scientifi c practices, as Burge believes it ought to be, mental 
properties are easily defensible. 
If physical events have mental properties, one is not entitled to the view 
that only physical properties (properties specifi ed in the physical sciences 
or in ordinary physicalistic discourse) determine all the causal powers of a 
physical event (as opposed to merely all the causal powers associated with 
physicalistic explanations of the physical event), unless one can show that 
mentalistic explanation is either non-causal or fails to describe patterns of 
causal properties. For the causal powers of a physical event that is mental 
might include possible effects that are specifi ed in mentalistic explanation. 
No one has shown that mentalistic explanation is either non-causal or non-
descriptive. Nor is either view plausible. (Burge 2007: 347)
What this shows is that only if the effect is specifi ed as physical (as 
belonging to the patterns of causation described by physics) mental 
properties are excluded. If it is specifi ed as mental (as a piece of inten-
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tional behaviour, for example), the mental properties easily fi nd their 
way back into the adequate explanation.
One problem that can be brought against such an analysis is that 
it is not certain whether it respects the so-called No-overdetermination 
principle,6 which is commonly invoked in discussions about mental 
causation. The principle states that physical effects cannot be over-
determined by physical and mental causes. A certain effect is said to 
be metaphysically overdetermined if it has two or more suffi cient, but 
metaphysically independent (Loewer 2015: 51). A common example 
of overdetermination is the case when there are two shooters, each 
of whom kills a victim. Overdetermination is only possible if the two 
cause are metaphysically independent. In the case of mental events, 
however, the mental and physical properties are not metaphysically 
independent an (Loewer 2015: 51)—hence the name of the principle—
No-overdetermination. Assuming physicalism, the dependence relation 
is usually described as that of supervenience of the mental properties 
on physical ones, or realization7 of mental properties by physical prop-
erties. Given this assumption, the two types of properties are again in 
the state of competition for a certain effect. And given CP, the mental 
properties come out as ineffi cacious. 
Burge rejects this argument by arguing that the view of causation 
it presupposes simply begs the question against the effi cacy of mental 
properties. The view he has in mind, I believe, is similar to an account 
of causation which views causation as a matter of “transference of 
quantities” such as energy and momentum (from now TQ).8 Burge fi nds 
such an account adequate for physical explanation, but problematic as 
a model for causal explanations as found in psychology:
Why should mental causes alter or interfere with the physical system if 
they do not materially consist in physical processes? Thinking that they 
must, surely depends on thinking of mental causes on a physical model—as 
providing an extra ‘bump’ on the effect. The idea seems to be that a cause 
must transfer a bit of energy or exert a force on the effect. (Burge 2007: 358)
If causation is understood as transference of quantities, mental causes 
are surely excluded, since, as Burge argues, they do not materially con-
sist in such processes. Presupposing TQ thus begs the question. What 
is needed to motivate CP in the kind of way which excludes the mental, 
Burge believes, is to show that a physical model of causation (such as 
TQ) is appropriate for psychological explanation. Only then would one 
be in position to claim that the mental and physical somehow interfere 
or overdetermine a given effect. However, he fi nds no support for such 
a view:
6 I take the term from Heil and Robb (2019), although my construal of the 
principle here differs from the one they give.
7 For supervenience, see Kim (1993). For realization Polger and Shapiro (2016).
8 See Dowe (2000) for a discussion of such theories of causation.
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But whether the physical model of mental causation is appropriate is, again, 
part of what is at issue. As we have seen, one can specify various ways in 
which mental causes ‘make a difference’ which do not confl ict with physi-
cal explanations. The differences they make are specifi ed by psychological 
causal explanations, and by counterfactuals associated with these explana-
tions. Such ‘differences’ made by psychological causes do not require that 
gaps be left in physical chains of causation. They do not seem to depend on 
any specifi c assumptions at all about the physical events underlying the 
mental causes. (Burge 2007: 358–359)
If the causal explanations found in physics and psychology do not inter-
fere, Burge concludes, there is no reason to believe that the properties 
these explanations invoke are mutually exclusive, as the principle of 
No-overdetermination suggests.9
5. A weakness in Burge’s analysis
Although being fairly sympathetic with Burges’s way of analysing the 
role CP has in EP, in this section I will try to express my worries with 
his analysis. I will try to show that his analysis does not support the 
conclusion that mental and physical properties are not mutually ex-
clusive and thus cannot serve Burge’s intention to present MCD as a 
misguided discussion.
As seen in the previous section, the way Burge tries to dispense 
with MCD is to show that causal explanation in psychology is not in-
compatible with a view of causation associated with natural sciences, 
thus showing that the worries surrounding the No-overdetermination 
principle are badly grounded. He concludes:
The upshot of this reasoning is that we have no ground for assuming that 
the failure of mental causes to interfere in the physical chain of events must 
be explained in terms of mental causes’ consisting in physical events. Inter-
ference would be surprising, given antecedent assumptions about mental 
and physical explanation. So non-interference is in no need of explanation 
in ontological terms. (Burge 2007: 359)
What Burge seems to be claiming is that overdetermination is prob-
lematic only if causation is understood on a model such as TQ. Only 
then the mental and physical somehow interfere or overdetermine a 
physical effect. But, as Burge argues, since such a model of causation 
is not appropriate for psychological explanation, one cannot presup-
9 In his article, Burge makes no reference to TQ specifi cally. Here I use it since it 
is suggested by the quoted passage of Burge’s article (Burge 2007: 358). Whether this 
account is appropriate as a model for explanations of physical events is questionable 
(see Dowe 2000 and Loewer 2015: 54). Furthermore, since the relationship between 
psychology and neuroscience is what is at issue here, Burge could have picked 
interventionism (Woodward 2003) which is popular among mechanistically-oriented 
philosophers of cognitive science. Nothing, however, depends on what account is 
taken as a model for physical causation, neither for Burge’s argument, nor for 
my objection in the next section. Here, TQ can be understood, somewhat broadly, 
as standing for any account of causation which will be shown as appropriate for 
explanations of physical events (in natural sciences).
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pose that it excludes mental causation. The only way one could show 
that TQ excludes the mental would be to show that that explanations 
in natural sciences and psychology interfere and this is not the case. I 
agree with Burge on this point. However, I do not agree with the jump 
Burge makes from the premise that physical and psychological expla-
nations do not interfere to the conclusion that the properties these ex-
planations invoke are not mutually exclusive. To show that this is the 
case, Burge would have to give an account of causation which would be 
both appropriate for psychological explanation and compatible with a 
model of causation such as TQ. And such an account is exactly what is 
missing in Burge’s analysis. Without an account of mental causation, 
I see no justifi able reason for Burge to uphold such a “compatibility” 
between different types of causation. What I am claiming is that the 
burden of argument is on Burge. Although he is correct in claiming that 
TQ is not suffi cient to exclude mental causation, he is not also justifi ed 
in claiming that TQ is compatible with mental causation. Such compat-
ibility requires a positive argument and Burge does not give one. Burge 
tries to argue that non-interference of psychological and physical ex-
planation warrants our belief in the compatibility of mental and physi-
cal causes. But this is not the case. Non-interference of psychological 
and physical explanation only support a negative conclusion, that is, 
the conclusion that TQ need not exclude other types of causation. But 
it does not support the conclusion that TQ is compatible with other 
types of causation (His insistence on the inadequacy of TQ as model for 
psychological explanation only makes this point more evident). This 
conclusion requires an account of mental causation, but Burge fails to 
provide one.10
If this reasoning is correct, it shows that Burge cannot avoid the 
problems associated with the No-overdetermination principle without 
giving an account of mental causation and its relationship with physi-
cal causation. But devising such an account of causation for psycho-
logical explanation amounts to nothing less than collapsing back into 
MCD, the very thing that Burge tried to present as futile. To see that 
this is so, one needs only notice that a huge portion of the literature 
concerning MCD is explicitly devoted to developing accounts of causa-
tion which would satisfy these constraints (Crane 2006: 1124). Such 
are, for example, accounts of causation which appeal to counterfactual 
dependence (Loewer 2015), structural causes (Dretske 1988) or pro-
gram explanation (Jackson and Petite 1990). Each of these aims to 
provide an account of causation which would make mental causation 
compatible with a physical model of causation.
10 This objection is similar to the worries Kim has with Burge’s analysis: “The 
issue is how to make our metaphysics consistent with mental causation, and the 
choice that we need to make is between various metaphysical alternatives, not 
between some recondite metaphysical principle on the one hand and some cherished 
epistemological practice or principle on the other” (Kim 1998: 62).
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The problem with Burge’s attempt to present MCD as a misguided 
discussion can thus be formulated as a dilemma. If Burge does not pro-
vide an account of mental causation, he lacks a strong argument for the 
compatibility of mental and physical causation. On the other hand, if 
he tries to provide such an account, he ends up participating in MCD.
In addition, some portions of Burge’s article can even be interpret-
ed as occupying a position in MCD. Burge’s central view, according 
to which the causal effi cacy of properties depends on the way events 
are kind-individuated overwhelmingly reminds of the so-called dual 
explanandum versions of mental causation, according to which the 
mental and physical properties of an event are causally effi cacious for 
different properties of the effect.11 At one point, Burge says:
...we know that the two causal explanations are explaining the same physi-
cal effect as the outcome of two very different patterns of events. The expla-
nations of these patterns answer two very different types of inquiry. (Burge 
2007: 359)
or in the passage quoted in the previous section, when Burge says the 
following:
For the causal powers of a physical event that is mental might include pos-
sible effects that are specifi ed in mentalistic explanation. (Burge 2007: 347)
If so, Burge’s analysis inherits the problems associated with these 
kinds of strategies. Unsurprisingly, the main problem dual explanan-
dum strategies face is the worry that they do not respect the No-over-
determination principle (Robb and Heil 2019), the very same principle, 
I argued, Burge cannot adequately overcome without giving an account 
of causation both appropriate for psychology and compatible with phys-
ical models of causation.
6. Conclusion
I will conclude by a brief methodological consideration. At several 
points in his article, Burge expresses his belief in some sort of meta-
physical dependence between the mental and the physical: 
There is certainly reason to believe that underlying our mental states and 
processes are physical, chemical, biological, and neural processes that pro-
ceed according to their own laws. Some such physical processes are probably 
necessary if intentional (or phenomenal) mental events are to be causes of 
behavior. (Burge 2007: 349)
On the other hand, however, his analysis of TIP and MCD supports 
a view of psychology and neuroscience as being importantly different 
scientifi c enterprises, whose taxonomies and explanations differ in im-
portant, even unbridgeable ways. The problem with such a view is that 
it leaves the relationship between psychology and neuroscience highly 
problematic. Since both of these are concerned with understanding 
cognition and behaviour, to insist that they can proceed on completely 
11 See Robb and Heil (2019) for an overview of such approaches.
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separate courses would be to advocate something in the spirit of averro-
sian “double truth theory,” according to which it is possible for religion 
and philosophy to arrive at mutually contradicting but true knowledge. 
At one point, Burge seems to be fi ne with such a view:
Maybe science will never make use of anything more than limited correla-
tions with the lower, more automatic parts of the cognitive system. Maybe 
identities or part–whole relations will never have systematic use. Maybe 
the traditional idea of a category difference will maintain a presence in sci-
entifi c practice. (Burge 2007: 360)
Some philosophers argue for a different picture of the relationship be-
tween psychology and neuroscience. For example, Bechtel (2008: 71) 
argues that cognitive scientists use identities between mental and 
brain processes as heuristics which then serve to improve both the psy-
chological and neuroscientifi c research. In a similar spirit, Polger and 
Shapiro (2016: 168–169), following Churchland (1986) see the relation-
ship between the two as one of coevolution and interplay in which both 
behavioural experiments and neuroscientifi c manipulations converge 
in advancing our understanding of cognitive phenomena. If that is the 
case, as Burge himself seems to accept at one point (Burge 2007: 381), 
then the various problems which MCD identifi es, such as the relation-
ship between different causal models or the question of metaphysical 
dependency, far from being theoretically unmotivating, come out as 
important in understanding the relationship between psychology and 
neuroscience. However, what this relationship will turn out to be, I 
agree with Burge, is an open question.
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